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Settler colonialism and Indigeneity: the Case of Israel/Palestine
The article examines notions of settlement, colonialism, and indigeneity, and 
their relevance for the case of Israel/Palestine. With a focus on the pre-1948 
period, it looks at how the Palestinian-Arab national movement and the 
Zionist movement offered different understandings of the process of Jewish 
immigration into the country and the opposing political claims that were 
raised in that historical context. It concludes with a discussion of the crucial 
role of the 1948 Nakba for future relations between the two ethno-national 
groups in the country, as it set the stage for the social and political conflicts 
that have plagued the state of Israel since its inception.
Der Artikel analysiert Vorstellungen von Besiedlung, Kolonialismus und 
Eingeborenheit und deren Bedeutung am Falle von Israel/Palästina. Mit dem
Zeitraum vor 1948 im Mittelpunkt untersucht der Artikel wie die 
palästinensische-arabische Nationalbewegung und die Zionistische 
Bewegung verschiedene Erklärungen anboten für den Prozess der jüdischen 
Emigration in das Land und wie sich gegensätzliche politische Ansprüche in 
diesem historischen Kontext ergaben. Die zentrale Rolle der Nakba (ethnische
Säuberung der palästinensischen Bevölkerung) im Jahre 1948 wird zum 
Schluß diskutiert und im Zusammenhang mit den zukünftigen Beziehungen 
zwischen den beiden ethnisch-nationalen Gruppen im Land gesehen, da die 
Nakba den Hintergrund für die sozialen und politischen Konflikte bildete, die
den Staat Israel seit seiner Gründung plagen.
1. Introduction: Settler Colonialism
In the last decade the concept of settler colonialism has gained currency as a new field
of study. It identifies a cluster of societies in which colonial rule – the overseas extension
of Europe-based states  –  was  combined with large-scale immigration of  metropolitan
settlers. Politically, it focuses on particularly resilient forms of domination that serve the
interests of settlers who made a new home for themselves in overseas territories. Facing
resistance  from  indigenous  people  to  their  subjugation,  settler  societies  were  shaped
historically  by ongoing conflict.  This has provided them with common features  and a
sense of shared destiny, based on the similar challenges they faced. Solidarity between
those  at  the  losing  end  –  indigenous  groups,  slaves  and  other  people  marginalized
through this form of colonial rule – is the other part of the process.1
1 See for example, Davis, Angela Y.: Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a 
Movement, Chicago 2016. On settler colonialism in general, see Veracini, Lorenzo: Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical 
Overview, Basingstoke 2010.
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At the same time, the extent to which the concept serves a useful purpose in historical
and theoretical analysis is less obvious and its utility in these respects is limited.2
What is the problem with settler  colonialism as a historical  concept? Its strongest
point  is  also  its  weakest:  it  is  applicable  to  cases  that  exhibit  a  great  diversity  of
conditions.  It  is  applied  to  societies  that  saw  settlers  overwhelm  the  indigenous
population to the point that it became demographically and economically marginal: no
more than 2-3% of the population in the USA, Canada and Australia.  In other places –
Kenya, Rhodesia, Algeria, Mozambique and South Africa – indigenous people remained
the bulk of the population and the main source of labour. Slavery featured in some cases
such as USA and early colonial South Africa, but not in others. European settlers retained
legal and political links to the mother country in Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia and Portugal’s
African colonies  but  became independent  in  the USA,  South Africa  and other  British
territories, often as a result of a violent intra-colonial conflict. 
In  some  countries  most  settlers  left  the  territory  after  independence  –  Algeria,
Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia – but substantial numbers stayed put in other places
such  as  Namibia  and  South  Africa.  And,  of  course,  where  they  became  numerically
dominant, settlers used their political independence to consolidate their rule, marginalize
‘natives’ further, but also to incorporate them into the new polity once they ceased posing
a demographic threat to settler domination. This contrasts with the retention of legal-
racial divisions in places where indigenous people remained a majority of the population.
Resistance strategies differed as well: attempts by natives to integrate as individuals
on an equal basis  in some societies,  maintaining pre-colonial  identities  and modes of
organization in others, forming nationalist movements on the new ground created by
colonial  settlement,  keeping a focus on race – all  with varying degrees of recognising
settlers as legitimate members of the envisaged liberated society.
It is not only the broad contours of history that vary greatly in settler colonial societies
but also patterns of social change over time. There was constant geographical expansion
while driving out indigenous people in some places such as the USA and Australia, and
constant expansion while incorporating indigenous people as labour power in others,
South Africa most notably. An initial takeover of the entire territory with more-or-less
fixed relations of subordination throughout the period was the case for Algeria, Kenya,
Rhodesia, Namibia. Diverse dynamics coexisted with different degrees of incorporation
of ‘urban natives’ in a relatively privileged position compared to rural populations, and
different combinations of direct and indirect rule. These continued to affect the evolution
of societies in the post-colonial period.3
The concept of settler  colonialism, then, is compatible with different demographic
ratios,  different trajectories of indigenous-settler relations, different relations between
settlers  and  metropolitan  centres,  different  destinies  of  settlers  in  the  post-colonial
period,  and  different  social  structures,  ranging  from  reliance  on  free  white  labour,
indentured  immigrant  labour  –  from  Europe,  India,  China  –  to  African  slavery,
2 See discussion in Bhandar, Brenny/Ziadah, Rafeef: Acts and Omissions: Framing Settler colonialism in Palestine Studies, 
Jadaliyya, 14th January 2016, online: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/23569/acts-and-omissions_framing-settler-
colonialism-in- [24.04.2017]; Greenstein, Ran: Settler Colonialism: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?, Jadaliyya, 6th 
June 2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/24603/settler-colonialism_a-useful-category-of-historica [24.04.2017].
3 As discussed in Mamdani, Mahmoud: Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, 
Princeton 1996.
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indigenous labour subordination, and many combinations of the above. In short, settler
colonial societies do not move in a similar direction, be it the consolidation of settler rule
or its demise through indigenous resistance. 
With all that diversity, one issue remains a unifying element of the cases mentioned
above:  the  distinction  between  indigenous  people  and  settlers  (including  their
descendants). The extent to which this serves as a foundation for political organization at
present  varies.  In  some  cases  it  is  no  more  than  a  historical  legacy,  important
symbolically, but no longer an active factor in shaping the contours of state and society.
One case in particular is different, however: the ongoing conflict in Israel/Palestine.
2. Israel/Palestine: Setting the scene
In  what  ways  are  notions  of  colonialism  in  general  and  settler  colonialism  in
particular relevant for Israel/Palestine? We can look at the issue from different angles: the
world-historical setting, the motivation of settlers, the perspective of indigenous people,
indeed our understanding of indigeneity in relation to different groups in the population,
notions of legality and force, relations of land and labour, global relations of power, and
so on. I touch here on some of these with a focus on the meanings that different actors
attach to their positionality and their relations to the land itself.
By definition, settlers and colonial forces are external in the sense that they arrived on
the scene from elsewhere at some specific point in time, and their foreign background
remains  central  to  their  identity.  They  may  have  lived  in  their  current  locale  for
generations but their origins in another part of the world (almost invariably Europe) are
known, acknowledged and taken for granted, as are the privileges they usually enjoy. The
question of if and when they can be considered to have become indigenous to the country
rarely  has an obvious answer though. Whites in South Africa, for example, even after
centuries of settlement are regarded by many people as not quite African in essence, and
many of them still emphasize their foreign origins. It is not a coincidence that the racial
term ‘blankes’  (literally ‘whites’)  was rendered in English usually as ‘Europeans’  under
apartheid rule.
The  position  of  Israeli  Jews  presents  a  particular  conundrum.  Are  they  settler  or
indigenous? On the one hand, their physical origin in other parts of the world (Eastern
Europe and the Middle East/North Africa region in particular) is obvious, though a small
minority lived in the country before the Zionist  era.  We have detailed documentation
about the immigration process, and know how many people arrived from where in which
specific  period of time, from the late 19th century to the present.  On the other hand,
Zionism as an ideology, the political movements inspired by it and the global forces that
provided diplomatic endorsement of its goals, maintain that Jews are indigenous to the
country, if not as individuals then as a collective – The Jewish People – that maintained
unique identity and link to the country over millennia, regardless of specific time and
space  configurations.  If  Israeli  Jews  are  indeed  indigenous,  they  have  not  invaded  a
foreign country and their settlement and establishment of a ‘national home’ or state there
is a form of ‘return’ and historical redress rather than an act of colonial conquest.
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Things look different from the perspective of Palestinian Arabs, who were the vast
majority  of  the  population  in  the  country  at  the  beginning  of  the  Jewish-Zionist
settlement process in the 1880s, and remained as such until Israel was established in 1948.
As the indisputable majority, whose position had not been challenged for many centuries,
since the time of the Crusades, they had not felt the need to develop an explicit ideology
or  justification  for  their  presence  in  the  country,  point  to  their  historical  rights  or
connections, and engage in active defence of political claims. Instead, they took their own
existence and settlement patterns throughout the country for granted. The presence of
Jews together with those of other religious and ethnic minorities posed no problem: it
was  natural  for  people  of  different  backgrounds  to  reside  in  the  same  places,  albeit
usually  in  somewhat  self-segregated  physical  spaces.  Immigration  of  individuals  who
settled  among  the  rest  of  the  population  without  making  specific  political  claims  or
forming distinct socio-economic structures was tolerated.4
All  that  changed  with  the  rise  of  the  Zionist  movement.  The  issue  was  not
immigration and settlement of Jews as such, but the overall political framework within
which these processes took place. By introducing the goal of making the country into a
Jewish homeland, Zionism singled out Palestine from all other immigration sites. Jews
did not go there to blend in, find a place for themselves among the existing population or
merely seek better living conditions, as they did in the UK, USA, Argentina, South Africa
and other destinations which attracted millions of people at the same time. Rather, they
became part of a project that targeted the country itself as the ultimate prize. 
Palestine was chosen for obvious religious and historical  reasons,  but there  was a
practical consideration involved as well.5 It was seen as a soft target, a small provincial
part of the large Ottoman Empire which was expected to be willing to grant Jews rights
there  in  exchange  for  diplomatic  and  financial  benefits.  The  precedent  of  Christian
communities  given  diplomatic  protection  by  European  powers  (Catholics  by  France,
Greek Orthodox by Russia, and Protestants by England) was applicable to Jews as well,
especially  those  who  retained  some  sort  of  European  citizenship.6 That  Jews  were
regarded as the original residents of the land, both in Christianity and Islam, before they
went into enforced exile, was an argument used to advance that goal. While the Ottoman
authorities did not go along with that, they frequently turned a blind eye to the small but
constant stream of Jewish immigrants that entered the country before the outbreak of
First  World War,  many of  whom  were part  of  a  conscious  effort  to  create  a  political
community on new foundations that would set it apart for the old Jewish Yishuv. 
The demise of the Ottoman Empire during the course of the First World War allowed
the  Zionist  movement to  find a  new  powerful  sponsor  for  its  settlement  project,  the
British Empire.7 In what may be regarded as the single most important document in the
4 For Palestinian nationalism in its early stages see Porath, Yehoshua: The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National 
Movement, 1918-1929, Frank Cass 1974; Muslih, Muhammad: The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, New York City 1988; 
Khalidi, Rashid: Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, New York City 1997.
5 On the use of traditional religious symbolism to serve the needs of modern Jewish nationalism see Sand, Shlomo: The 
Invention of the Jewish People, New York City 2009; Sand, Shlomo: The Invention of the Land of Israel: From Holy Land to 
Homeland, New York City 2012. A critical discussion in Greenstein, Ran: Shlomo Sand and the De-Mystification of Jewish 
History, in: Socialism & Democracy, 29, 1 (March 2015), pp. 152–63. 
6 Masters, Bruce: Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism, Cambridge 2001.
7 Ingrams, Doreen: Palestine Papers, 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict, London 1972.
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history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – the Balfour Declaration of 2nd November 1917
– the British government announced that it would “view with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be
done  which  may  prejudice  the  civil  and  religious  rights  of  existing  non-Jewish
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other
country.”8
The  Declaration  made  no  mention  of  existing  Jewish  communities  in  Palestine
(Zionist-inspired or not), or of links Jews might have with the country. The latter were
mentioned though in the text of the Palestine Mandate, adopted by the Council of the
League  of  Nations  in  1922,  which  was  based  on  recognition  “given  to  the  historical
connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their
national home in that country”. In consequence, Britain was given the responsibility “for
placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will
secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and
the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and
religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.”9
The  British  Administration  of  Palestine  was  mandated  to  “facilitate  Jewish
immigration  under  suitable  conditions”  and  to  encourage,  in  co-operation  with  the
Zionist  Organisation,  “close settlement by Jews on the land”, while ensuring that “the
rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.” It was tasked
further “to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their
permanent residence in Palestine.”
The  language  used  in  the  document  was  indicative  of  the  way  the  “historical
connection” of “the Jewish People” to Palestine was conceptualized. It was a connection of
an entire group of people to the entire country, without making any internal distinctions
within  these  terms.  In  other  words,  there  was  no  attempt  to  make claims about  any
specific Jewish individuals or communities and their concrete links to any specific piece
of land, house, village, town or region. It was based on generalized abstract notions rather
than on differentiated historically-grounded evidence. It was difficult to reconcile with
the ‘normal’ rules of claims to property or territory,  which are based on demonstrable
links between specific individuals or groups and specific assets and locations.
Palestinian Arabs  accepted neither  the  validity  of  Jewish  historical  claims nor  the
practical political implications that flowed from them. In a last-ditch effort to prevent the
inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the text of the Mandate,  they sent a high-level
delegation  to  London  in  1922  to  negotiate  with  the  British  government.  Their  main
grievance was with the British using their authority “to impose upon the people against
their wishes a great immigration of alien Jews”. They called on them to “put a stop to all
alien immigration and grant the People of Palestine … Executive and Legislative powers”.
Any constitution that fell short of granting Palestinians full control of their affairs, they
said, would “be used to smother their national life under a flood of alien immigration.”1

8Balfour Declaration: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp [24.04.2017].
9Mandate for Palestine: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp [24.04.2017].
1
Quotes from Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation (London, June 1922): 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/48A7E5584EE1403485256CD8006C3FBE [24.04.2017].
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The  Palestine  Arab  Delegation  called  for  a  constitution  to  provide  for  a  national
independent  government  while  safeguarding  the  legal  rights  of  foreigners  and
minorities. This was rejected by the British as inconsistent with the Balfour Declaration,
which continued to serve as the foundation for their policies. The meaning of a ‘National
Home’  for  the  Jews,  the  British  said,  was  that  “the  Jews,  who  are  a  people  scattered
throughout the world, but whose hearts are always turned to Palestine should be enabled
to  found  here  their  home,  and  that  some  amongst  them,  within  the  limits  fixed  by
numbers and the interests of the present population, should come to Palestine in order to
help  by  their  resources  and efforts  to  develop  the country  to  the  advantage  of  all  its
inhabitants.” The Delegation responded by saying that “Alien Jews not in Palestine do not
come within the scope” of the League of Nations Covenant, “neither is their association
with Palestine more close than that of Christians and Moslems all over the world.”
This was the crucial distinction: Palestinians accepted that Jews residing in Palestine
at the time should be treated equally to others (Muslims and Christians comprising 93% of
the population). However, they rejected the application of this principle to non-resident
Jews. Jews already living in the country thereby became indigenous but could not extend
that status to others just because they shared religion or ethnic identity with them. The
British, on the other hand, focused on the “further development of the existing Jewish
community; with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may
become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion
and race, an interest and a pride … [knowing] that it is in Palestine as of right and not on
sufferance.”
In essence, there was a clash between two ways of looking at the issue: (1) Jews were
concrete flesh-and-blood individuals, present in Palestine but mostly elsewhere, members
of multiple communities, linked by religion but located in many places and differentiated
by distinct historical experiences, languages, cultures and political interests, and (2) there
was one Jewish People with an overarching identity transcending time and space.  Its
unity  meant  that  its  members  shared a  right  to  Palestine  (their  historical  homeland)
regardless of personal experiences, religious beliefs, concrete links to the territory, and
physical location at present. That the vast majority of Jews never set foot in the country,
were totally unfamiliar with its features,  had no relationship to any physical assets or
locations within it, and no individual or family links to it, even from the distance of many
generations, made no difference. The right to the country as a whole was not dependent
on the physical presence of Jews in any part of it at any given point in time.
From the perspective of Zionism, then, shared to an extent by the British, some of
whom were inspired by Protestant millenarianism, Jews were indigenous to Palestine due
to  their  historical  link  to  it.  From  the  perspective  of  Palestinians,  Jews  who  lived  in
Palestine at the time had rights  in the country but not  to it. Immigration was a way of
granting indigenous rights to those not entitled to them. That was particularly the case as
the acquisition of personal rights – to settle in the country as individuals – paved the way
to a collective claim by a group, to make the country its own, whether the language of a
‘national home’, a ‘commonwealth’ or a ‘state’ was used. 
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3. Ending the Mandate
It is important to realize that the Zionist movement’s efforts to claim Palestine and
recruit global actors to support its cause were not simply based on the notion of Jews
returning to their  land. Arguments based on current needs, interests  and rights were
central.  Chaim  Weizmann,  giving  evidence  to  UN  Special  Committee  on  Palestine
(UNSCOP) in 1947 said: “Palestine, for reasons which I need not labour, releases energies,
activities  in the Jewish people which are not released anywhere else … and the rocks,
marshes, and sands of Palestine became a precious possession into which we pour our
sweat, blood, effort and ingenuity in order to make it what it is.” Variations on familiar
myths of ‘making the desert bloom’ and ‘a land without people for a people without a land’
served to reassert Jewish claims to the country: “here in Palestine there were marshes and
we have drained them; there were stones and we have planted over them; there were no
houses and we have built them; it was ridden with disease and we have cleared it. All that
has been done here, from the modest cottage of the settler to the University on Mount
Scopus, is the work of Jewish planning, Jewish genius and of Jewish hands and muscles,
not only of money and initiative.”11
David Ben-Gurion, speaking on behalf of the Jewish Agency, focused at his UNSCOP
testimony  on  the  specific  features  of  Jewish  history  –  albeit  in  a  version  that  most
historians  would  recognise  as  mythical  rather  than  factual  –  that  made  the  link  to
Palestine essential: “Our entire history is a history of continuous resistance to superior
physical forces which tried to wipe out our Jewish image and to uproot our connections
with our country and with the teaching of our prophets. We did not surrender, we never
surrender to sheer physical force deprived of moral validity. We paid a dear price for our
resistance. We lost our independence. We were dispossessed of our homeland. We were
exiled to strange lands.”12
He  continued  in  a  similar  vein,  portraying  Jewish  history  as  an  eternal  cycle  of
oppression and resistance: “There were two main things which enabled us to survive all
these persecutions – our faith in Zion, faith in our national revival, and our faith in the
vision of our prophets for the future, and our faith in a new world of justice and peace …
You are faced with a tragic problem, perhaps the tragic problem of our time and of many
generations,  of a people which was twice forcibly driven out of its  country and which
never acquiesced in its dispossession, and although it was its bitter destiny to wander in
exile for many centuries it  always remained attached with all  its heart  and soul to its
historic homeland. It is a unique fact in world history.”
Like Weizmann, Ben-Gurion used the trope of physical labour to re-claim the country:
“What distinguished the Jewish community in Palestine from Jewish communities in the
Diaspora, is precisely that fundamental change in our economic structure, that the great
majority of our people here are people who are doing hard manual work in the fields, in
11 Weizmann’s July 1947 testimony in: 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/364a6ac0dc52ada785256e8b00716662?
OpenDocument [24.04.2017].
12 All quotes from Ben-Gurion’s testimony in July 1947 in: 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/7735b7dc144807b985256e8b006f4a71?
OpenDocument [24.04.2017].
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the factories,  at sea and on the roads.”  This was crucially important in distinguishing
Zionist  settlement  from  colonial  settlement  in  other  places:  “I  came  to  see  Sir  John
Chancellor, who was High Commissioner from 1928 to 1931, to ask that Jewish workers be
given a share in Government road works. Sir John, who had come from Rhodesia, tried to
convince me that the most suitable system for this country would be the one existing in
South Africa, that the primitive, hard, unskilled work should be left to the ‘native,’ while
the Jews should concentrate on skilled,  better  paid jobs.  He was very much surprised
when I told him that this was precisely the status which we would in no circumstances
accept in our country. We were not here to form a superior class leaving the rough and
hard work to others. While we are willing to use our brains, we must and want to use our
hands and do every kind of work which is necessary for the maintenance of society. We
believe  that  the  homeland cannot  be  bought  nor  conquered.  It  must  be  created,  and
created by hard work.”
In a move with long-lasting implications, Ben-Gurion positioned Jewish Palestine in
the context of the Arab world rather than Arab Palestine: “Nobody can seriously claim that
a Jewish Palestine could in any way endanger or harm the independence or unity of the
Arab race. The area of Western Palestine is less than 1% of the vast territory occupied by
the Arab States in the Near East, excluding Egypt. The number of Arabs in this country is
less than 3% of the number of Arabs who have gained their political independence. The
Arabs in Palestine, even if they were a minority, would still be a part of that large Arab
majority in the Middle East. The existence of Arab States to the north, east, and south of
Palestine is an automatic guarantee, not only of the civil, religious and political rights of
the Arabs in Palestine, but also of their national aspirations.”
The  two  rhetorical  devices  –  the  centrality  of  settlers  in  re-building  and  thereby
claiming the country, and the relegation of Palestinians (a majority locally) into a small
subset of the overall Arab population, therefore of minor importance – were crucial to the
case for a Jewish state made, somewhat poetically, by Zionist leaders. Arab spokespersons
stuck, in contrast,  to more prosaic  considerations,  such as majority rule.  Arab-British
academic and activist, Albert Hourani, expressed to the Anglo-American Committee of
Enquiry of 1946 Arab opposition to a Jewish state, “based upon the unwavering conviction
of  unshakeable  rights  and  a  conviction  of  the  injustice  of  forcing  a  long-settled
population to accept immigrants without its consent being asked and against its known
and expressed will; the injustice of turning a majority into a minority in its own country;
the injustice of withholding self-government until the Zionists are in the majority and
able to profit by it.” The solution therefore was “the constitution of Palestine, with the
least possible delay, into a self-governing state, with its Arab majority, but with full rights
for the Jewish citizens of Palestine … a state in which questions of general concern, like
immigration,  should be  decided  by  the  ordinary  democratic  procedure in  accordance
with the will of the majority.”13
When the UN General Assembly adopted the partition resolution in November 1947,
dividing Palestine into two states, it went along with the notion that Jews were entitled to
a state, but only in areas where they had established substantial presence in the previous
decades, even though Palestinians remained a large minority there. The location of new
13 The Case against a Jewish State in Palestine: Albert Hourani’s Statement to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry of
1946, in: Journal of Palestine Studies, 35, 1 (Autumn 2005), pp. 80–90.
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Jewish settlements  played a crucial  role in determining the boundaries;  historical  and
religious links proved irrelevant. Provision was made for immigration, ensuring that an
area “including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial
immigration” be made ready in Jewish territory before the Mandate expired. Other than
that, the entire text of the resolution dealt with Jews and Arabs already residing in the
country  as  equals  with  no  preferential  treatment  on  the  basis  of  indigenous  status,
historical rights or religious claims. The Jewish/Arab nature of the envisaged states had to
do with demography only: those residing within the boundaries of either state were to
“become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political
rights”. The Jewish People (a singular entity rather than a multiplicity of individuals) was
not mentioned at all.14
The matter-of-fact language of the United Nations resolution, with its concern with
practical arrangements, contrasts with Israel’s Declaration of Independence of May 1948.
It asserts the Land of Israel as “the birthplace of the Jewish People” and the place where
“their spiritual,  religious and political identity was shaped.” This was applicable to the
country  as  whole,  not  to  the  area  specifically  allocated  to  the  Jewish  state.  The  land
remained eternally central: “After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept
faith with it  throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their
return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom. Impelled by this historic
and traditional  attachment,  Jews strove in  every  successive  generation  to  re-establish
themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses.
Pioneers, defiant returnees, and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew
language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving community controlling its own
economy and culture.”15
Although recent events  made the creation of Israel  necessary as a  safe  haven (the
Holocaust obviously), the main thrust of the Declaration was the need to “confer upon the
Jewish  people  the  status  of  a  fully  privileged  member  of  the  community  of  nations,”
expressing “the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all
other nations, in their own sovereign State.” Focus was placed on Jewish independence
and self-segregation, not only in the course of a long history but in recent decades as well.
This  may  not  have  been  unusual;  rather  a  fairly  common  feature  of  nationalist
movements asserting their competing claims to territorial and political control. Neither
were  the  ensuing  military  clashes,  which  involved  both  internal  and  external  forces,
unusual. One feature of the situation however, which began to manifest itself just after
the  UN partition  resolution (November  1947)  and had  become full-fledged  already  by
March-April 1948, was indeed unusual. It was the way in which territorial gains for the
Jewish side were increasingly accompanied by ethnic cleansing, a process that became
known as the Nakba (disaster or catastrophe in Arabic).
 
14 UN General Assembly Resolution 181, 29th November 1947: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/res181.asp 
[24.04.2017].
15 Israel’s Declaration of Independence, 14th May 1948: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/israel.asp [24.04.2017].
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4. The Nakba and its Implications
On the face  of  it,  1948  saw  a  war  between  two communities,  each trying  to  gain
control of as much land and power as possible from the departing British forces. The
Jewish  side  managed  to  acquire  a  larger  territory  and  evict  many  Palestinians  who
resided there, sending them to areas under the control of Arab forces. It was a messy
outcome, so the argument goes, but no different in essence from that of other conflicts
unfolding under similar circumstances: Turkey and Greece in the aftermath of the First
World War, Czechoslovakia and Germany in the aftermath of the Second World War,
India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1947 partition that ended colonial rule on the
sub-continent.
Similarities between the situations above pointed out by this mainstream version of
history are real, but three crucial features make the case of the Nakba distinctive:
 It  involved  the  displacement  of  indigenous  people  by  recently-arrived  settler
immigrants:  a  vast  majority  of  local  Jews  by  1948  had  moved  to  Palestine  in  the
previous three decades, and new immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Middle
East doubled their numbers within the next four years. In the other cases above those
involved were equally  indigenous to the scene as they had co-existed in the same
territory for centuries.
 It  affected  almost  exclusively  one  side:  for  every  Jew  displaced  in  the  1948  war
hundreds  of  Palestinians  lost  their  homes.  In  other  cases,  displacement  of
populations  usually  was  mutual.  Jews  were  indeed  displaced  from  other  Arab
countries later on, but not by Palestinians, not at their behest or on their behalf.
 It saw the displacement of 80% of the Arab population residing in what became Israel
(60% of the overall Arab population). In other cases only a small segment on either
side of the ethnic divide was involved, usually no more than five percent of the total.
The bulk of the population was not affected directly.
The  partition  of  Palestine  and  subsequent  war  resulted  in  the  destruction  of
indigenous Arab society through the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian
residents in a process of ethnic cleansing  avant la lettre,  and the rise of a new settler-
dominated state in its place.16 Within a year,  the Jewish population, most members of
which were foreign-born or first generation in the country, became the overwhelming
majority while Arabs were reduced to the status of a small, vulnerable minority. This was
not a coincidence, a series of unfortunate events, or an unintended outcome of chaotic
war  conditions.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  Jewish-Zionist
settlement  project  in  Palestine  embarked  on  building  an  ever-expanding  zone  of
exclusion from which all local Arabs were barred. Tenants were not allowed to stay on
land bought by settlement agencies, nor were Palestinians accepted as residents in new
rural  Jewish  communities  or  urban  neighbourhoods.  The  campaigns  for  Conquest  of
Land and Conquest of Labour were not always or completely successful, but they did set
in  motion exclusionary  dynamics  aimed to  remove  Arab  workers  from  Jewish-owned
16 Morris, Ben: The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge 2004; Pappe, Ilan: The Ethnic Cleansing 
of Palestine, London 2006.
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enterprises,  and eliminate  (or at  least  reduce)  dependence on Palestinian agricultural
produce. The British imperial authorities facilitated this process.17
The motivation behind that had nothing to do with ‘security’. Rather, the goal of the
project was to build up a society in which Jews would be in control of their own affairs,
overcoming their status elsewhere as a minority.  Importantly,  it  was not an inevitable
outcome of Jewish settlement as such. In the first immigration wave from 1882 to 1904,
known as the First  Aliyah, settlers made extensive use of local Arab labour, in the fields
and at homes, in a pattern familiar from cases of European overseas expansion, such as
Algeria, Kenya and South Africa. However, they did so with a distinct difference: the small
scale of the project and its unfolding under the framework of a regional political order –
the  Ottoman  Empire  –  meant  that  it  had  limited  impact  on  local  society.  From  the
perspective of the Zionist movement, that pattern had a basic flaw, however. It limited
employment opportunities for potential Jewish workers and therefore was not conducive
for large-scale immigration and settlement. 
By the second decade of the twentieth century, under the impact of the Zionist labour
movement  and  against  resistance  from  Jewish  farming  interests,  a  new  pattern  of
settlement had begun to dominate the process. It was based on job reservation for Jewish
immigrants, which resulted in the eviction of cheaper and more productive Arab workers.
It  was  followed  by  experimentation  with  collective  forms  of  economic  production,
especially in agriculture, to allow more efficient use of resources in competition with Arab
producers. 
This shift was driven ideologically by socialist-oriented activists,  who called for the
‘normalization’ of Jewish existence, grounding it in productive labour – agriculture and
industry.  Ben-Gurion’s  testimony  above  expressed  this  attitude.  Strong  political
commitment and financial subsidies were required to sustain this effort, which was made
possible by mobilizing resources from numerous overseas-based individual supporters.
Still  a  marginal  perspective  during the Ottoman period,  the  drive  to  base  the Zionist
project on recruiting, training and deploying large numbers of workers, was given a boost
with the transition to British rule and the ‘Jewish national home’ policy in the aftermath
of the First World War.
The core elements of the emerging society had been put in place by 1948, and the war
that year served to consolidate them further. Before then, land transfers and the eviction
of Arab tenants and workers were limited by British administrative regulations and the
lack of  settler  coercive capacity.  But once the British departed from the scene,  Israeli
political  independence and access to superior military force allowed the new state the
freedom to pursue policies of ethnic cleansing and land dispossession on a massive scale.
The  Nakba  took  place  three  years  after  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  and  the
Holocaust, giving the Israeli side a sense of moral justification, bordering on immunity,
to do whatever it had to ensure what it deemed national survival. 
The ethnic cleansing of 1948 shaped Israeli society in several ways which remain of
crucial  importance  today and account  for  its  particular  ethnic  stratification  patterns.
17An extended discussion of exclusionary social and political dynamics in the pre-1948 period is found in Greenstein, Ran: 
Genealogies of Conflict: Class, Identity and State in Palestine/Israel and South Africa to 1948, Middletown (Connecticut), 
1995.
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They  re-shaped  the  indigenous-settler  issue  completely  and  positioned  it  in  a  new
historical context:
 By removing the bulk of the indigenous population it ensured that Jews acquired a
dominant position in society as the undisputed majority. From that point onwards,
the new demographic status quo became a shared platform for all mainstream forces,
from the hard right and religious orthodox parties to liberal and left-wing Zionists. It
mandated  unwavering  support  for  the  Law  of  Return  for  Jews,  and  resolute
opposition to the Right of Return of Palestinian refugees. The notion of Israel as a
‘Jewish democratic state’ rests on this foundation, which became part of the global
diplomatic consensus on the issue.
 By reducing the proportion of internal Palestinians to 15-20% of all  Israelis (and a
similar percentage of all Palestinians), it entrenched their status as a minority, but
also facilitated their incorporation as citizens. This would not have been possible had
they remained a larger  part  of  the  population.  From a  truncated  community,  left
defeated without leadership and socially marginalized, they managed to consolidate
themselves  over  the  years  into  a  self-conscious  and  unified  minority,  powerfully
asserting their rights.
 By creating a large population of refugees across the borders (and even within them
–the  ‘present  absentees’,  internally  displaced  citizens),  it  ensured  a  state  of
permanent  tension,  requiring  constant  vigilance,  militarization,  and  enhanced
security consciousness, all of which became essential features of public life in Israel.
On the Palestinian side it created a political adversary located primarily outside the
territory  it  sought  to  liberate,  an  unprecedented  situation  in  the  history  of  anti-
colonial movements.
 Finally, by emptying parts of the country of their Arab population, it created both the
space needed to settle new immigrants and the necessity for large numbers of people
to fill in the resulting gaps, both geographical and social. The original Zionist vision
was based on the expectation that Eastern European Jews, numbering in the millions,
would re-locate to Palestine to build a new state and society. But, the majority of these
potential immigrants were murdered in the Holocaust and many surviving Jews were
unable to leave due to restrictions on movement imposed by Soviet-aligned regimes.
Mizrahim (‘Oriental’ Jews from the Middle East and North Africa) were one group the
state could access and manipulate with relative ease to play the roles of demographic
barrier,  cheap  labour  force  and  cannon  fodder.  Growing  xenophobic  sentiments
among  Arab  nationalist  movements  and  states  contributed  to  the  dislocation  of
Jewish communities into Israel in the post-1948 period. A new ethnic hierarchy thus
emerged, affecting internal relations and the broader conflict.18
In all these respects the legacy of the 1948 war is alive. Of crucial importance is the
excluded presence of the refugees,  a spectre that haunts Israeli society not by directly
shaping  people’s  consciousness  –  many  are  not  even  aware  of  its  existence  –  but  by
18 On Mizrahim see Shenhav, Yehouda: The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity, 
Stanford 2006.
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nurturing an ever-present siege mentality, expectations of doom and fears of imminent
destruction. Not only must all precedents for the return of refugees be denied (even if
they are Israeli citizens, as are those from the demolished Galilee villages of Bir’im and
Iqrit),  but  the  impulse  that  initially  led  to the  Nakba continues  to be  at  work.  Home
demolitions, land confiscations, forced removals of Bedouin communities on both sides
of the Green Line, denial of recognition to informal settlements and planning restrictions
in formal Palestinian settlements,  denial  of  residence rights  to  Palestinian spouses of
Israeli citizens, gradual revocation of residence rights in East Jerusalem – these policies
are not as dramatic as those of 1948 but share the same imperative: to restrict and reduce
the size, spread and capacity of the Palestinian population.19
Having that said, the most remarkable and surprising feature of post-1948 Israel is the
sense of  ordinary existence that it  gave its  Jewish citizens,  who regard themselves  as
similar to ethnic majorities elsewhere, whose indigenous status is not in question. The
memory of the Nakba was quickly swept away as mass immigration into the country and
rapid natural growth left those who participated or knew about it a small minority of the
population. The culture of silence and denial prevented those who may have wished to
learn  more  from  questioning  the  situation.  Systematic  removal  of  physical  remains
completed  the  process.2
 Jewish  demographic  dominance  became  the  new  norm.
Palestinians  within  Israel  knew  of  course  what  had  happened,  but  were  socially
marginalized, residing in segregated communities and becoming culturally confined due
to their different language. Politically, the issue of the refugees and their right of return
became a taboo, threatening its advocates with dire consequences. 
The status of refugees was central to Palestinians outside the country, their identity
and  social  position,  but  their  voices  were  not  heard  within  Israel.  The  international
community referred to them as a ‘problem’ in need of a humanitarian ‘solution’, rather
than as agents  working to advance their legitimate cause.  It was only in the mid-late
1960s that the situation began to change with the rise of the new Palestinian national
movement and the June 1967 war, and discussion of colonial settlement and resistance
was revived in the new context, but that is a topic for another discussion.
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